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IN DEFENSE OF LAW: THE COMMON-SENSE
JURISPRUDENCE OF AQUINAS
Sean B. Cunninghamt
I. INTRODUCTION
In his thirteenth-century Treatise on Law, St. Thomas Aquinas defined a law
as "nothing else than an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by
him who has care of the community, and promulgated."' Perhaps surprisingly,
this definition seems to capture well our understanding of the term "law" even
today. Common sense tells us that laws are, at least for the most part,
reasonable directives publicly promulgated by authorized lawmakers for the
good of the whole community. Regardless of their political leanings, citizens
who believe that a particular enactment or judicial interpretation is bad policy,
favors special interests, or thwarts the will of their elected representatives,
typically consider the enactment or ruling a bad law or a subversion of what the
law really is.
2
Much of our political debate focuses on questions that implicitly assume the
normative truth of this definition.3 Is a law good-i.e., is it reasonable, fair,
and based on good policy? Should the law forbid or encourage such-and-such
activity? Who should make our laws-the legislature or the courts? Are the
processes for resolving legal disputes over our elections legitimate? Are our
laws being made for the good of all the people or only for the benefit of special
interests? How should the law protect the weak, help the poor, preserve order
t Partner of Hunton & Williams LLP, Washington, DC. The opinions expressed
in this article are solely my own and are not intended to represent the views of Hunton
& Williams or its clients. Special thanks to Dean Bruce W. Green, the faculty,
students, and editorial staff of the Liberty University Law Review for their generous
invitation to submit this article. Thanks also to Mark Ryland and John Safranek for
their helpful comments.
1. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-II, Q. 90, art. 4, c. (Fathers of the English
Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. 1947).
2. Compare Lauren Bans, Anatomy of a Bad Law, THE NATION, Apr. 17, 2006,
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060417/bans (arguing that South Dakota's law banning
abortion is based on flawed research), with Cal Thomas, Unequal Justice Under a Bad Law,
JEWISH WORLD REv., June 18, 1999, http://www.jewishworldreview.com/
cols/thomas061899.asp (arguing that the federal Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act
unjustly violates the constitutional rights of pro-life activists who picket abortion clinics).
3. In modem jurisprudence, it is common to distinguish between the "normative" and the
"empirical." Aquinas does not use this terminology, and does not draw a sharp distinction
between the two. Where a particular law is empirically inconsistent with the normative
definition, it is not, properly speaking, a law. Nevertheless, his normative definition is based on
observation of legal phenomena. See generally AQUINAS, supra note 1.
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in the streets, improve education and health care, defend families, provide for
the common defense, or advance any of a variety of other policies that reflect
concepts of value or goodness (i.e., concepts of morality)? Perhaps many laws
fall short of this definition in certain respects, but it seems to be a reasonable
normative definition, or at least a common starting point for endless public
debates.
Given the definition's plausibility at first glance, it is even more surprising
that academic jurists and political philosophers have been attacking elements of
the definition for decades, and in some respects, centuries. Some jurists regard
the notion that law is intelligible, consistently applied, and reasonable as at best,
dubious, or at worst, a mask for class interest. 4 Others dismiss the notion that
statutory (or, still less, constitutional) text can have a determinate meaning as
rigid "formalism." 5 Some appear to conclude that the concept of the rule of
law, as opposed to a rule of individual men and special interests, is na'fve.6
Others perceive the notion that some sort of objective morality is knowable and
superior to human positive law as either irrational or dangerous, 7 or
4. E.g., Morton J. Horwitz, The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without
Fundamentalism, 107 HARv. L. REv. 30, 100-02 (1993).
5. There are many varieties of the "indeterminancy thesis," often associated with the
Critical Legal Studies school ofjurisprudence. Theorist Stanley Fish generally describes this
view as follows: "[Jiudges are not constrained by the rules and texts that supposedly ground the
legal process...." STANLEY FISH, THERE's No SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT'S A GOOD
THING, Too 189 (1994). A more radical variant claims that indeterminacy is a "general feature
of all interpretation; no matter what constraints are supposedly in place, they will not check the
interpretive will, which can always re-characterize them on the way to pursuing its own agenda."
Id. at 190. For Fish, even obvious, "unproblematical instances are unproblematic only within
interpretive conditions-specifications of what counts as evidence, arguments as to the weight
and shape of precedent, etc.-which, while presently settled, can themselves become the object
of dispute and so become problematical." Id.
6. According to Fish:
[T]he indeterminacy thesis, judges are not constrained by the rules and texts that
supposedly ground the legal process, and this absence of constraint [raises the
concern that judicial decision making is inherently] undemocratic because the
decisions follow from the desires of particular judges rather than from the
directions embedded in public texts, and illegitimate because the result is a
government not of laws but of men.
FISH, supra note 5, at 189-90.
7. See, e.g., Ken Gewertz, Heavyweights Battle Over the Pledge ofAllegiance, HARV. U.
GAzETTE, Sept. 26, 2002, http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2002/09.26/13-pledge.html
(quoting Harvard Professor Alan Dershowitz as saying "[n]atural law is dangerous! You invoke
[Vol. 1: 1
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acknowledge only an extremely narrow variety of natural law.' Some see
statutory interpretation as only a technique for advancing the client's interest or
the judge's political agenda.9 Oliver Wendell Holmes suggested that the
traditional notion of law as a rational system of concepts and moral principles
needs to be "wash[ed] ... with cynical acid [to] expel everything except the
object of our study, the [actual] operations of the law." 10
II. PROSPECTUS AND APOLOGY
This Article discusses several important themes in Aquinas'sjurisprudence,
focusing on his definition of law. The Article suggests that Aquinas's
definition of law is relevant to contemporary legal and political issues, and
identifies a number of questions that may need to be further addressed in order
to recover a "common sense" jurisprudence in the tradition of Aquinas. Such
common sense may help neutralize the "cynical acid" that, in the academy at
least, has corroded the intellectual respectability of the concept of a law as an
intelligible, consistently applicable rule formulated by legitimate authorities for
the true moral good of the community. This Article represents a partial effort
toward the broader project of renewing Aquinas's philosophical jurisprudence
in an age that tends to equate philosophy in general with doubt and obfuscation
rather than common sense and clarity.
The Article does not do several things. While it takes note of some general
trends in jurisprudence, particularly in the twentieth century, it does not provide
a summary or systematic analysis of the history of modern jurisprudence. Nor
does it provide a systematic summary of the philosophical underpinnings of
Aquinas's jurisprudence, much of which is drawn from Aristotle's philosophy
of being, knowledge, ethics, and politics. It does not emphasize the theological
ground of natural law, which Martin Luther King and others have powerfully
articulated in the context of civil rights issues." This Article focuses on
natural law when you want to get your way without having to argue about it. Jefferson believed
in natural law, but Jefferson was wrong!").
8. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, 189-94 (1961) (discussing the "minimum content
of natural law" as consisting of basic protections of persons, property, and contractual
promises).
9. See Gary E. O'Connor, Restatement (First) ofStatutory Interpretation, N.Y.U. J. LEGis.
& PUB. POL'Y 333, 343 (2004) (lamenting that existing treatises on statutory interpretation are
little more than sourcebooks for advocates to persuade the court that a statute should be
interpreted in favor of their clients). See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of
Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND.
L. REv. 395 (1950).
10. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897).
11. See generally MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., LETrER FROM BIRMINGHAM CITYJAIL (1963),
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statutory law, with only passing reference to common law jurisprudence, which
is of obvious relevance to the subject matter.12 Many of these themes are more
ably discussed in the extensive contemporary literature on Aquinas's natural
law theory.'
3
This Article briefly makes note of the prevalent skepticism, cynicism, and
nihilism that characterize much of modem academic jurisprudence. The Article
then addresses Aquinas's definition in terms of five key themes: (1) the rule of
law; (2) the intelligibility of law (and its limits); (3) the common good as the
reprinted in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN
LUTHER KING, JR., 289-302 (James Melvin Washington ed., 1986) (drawing on classics of the
Western natural law tradition to demonstrate the moral wrongs of racial segregation); Robert P.
George, Address at the 1993 St. Ives Lecture Series, Natural Law and Civil Rights: From
Jefferson's Letter to Henry Lee to Martin Luther King's Letter From Birmingham Jail, 43 CATH.
U. L. REv. 143, 143 (1993) (discussing Dr. King's recognition that moral laws are "not merely
contingent [or] conventional"). Although Aquinas's definition of law is, properly speaking, a
definition in an Aristotelian sense and can be usefully discussed and applied in purely secular
terms, his understanding of law, and natural law in particular, is closely related to his theology
of creation, his philosophy of divine governance of creatures through the "Eternal Law," and his
explication of the ceremonial and moral precepts of the "Divine positive law" in the Old and
New Testaments. As King eloquently emphasized, the Divine law often sheds light where
prejudice and confusion have obscured the natural law. Aquinas explained the need for the
Divine Law: "'on account of uncertainty of human judgment, especially on contingent and
particular matters, different people form different judgments on human acts; whence also
different and contrary laws result. In order, therefore, that man may know without any doubt
what he ought to do what he ought to avoid, it was necessary for man to be directed in his
proper acts by a law given by God, for it is certain that such a law cannot err." For the definitive
scholarly treatment of natural law in the context of Aquinas' theology, see RUSSELL HITINGER,
THE FIRST GRACE: REDISCOVERING THE NATURAL LAW IN A POST-CHRISTIAN WORLD (2003).
12. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
3-15 (1997) (discussing the tensions between Anglo-American common law jurisprudence and
modem statutory construction).
13. See, e.g., SCOTT BUCHANAN, So REASON CAN RULE: REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND POLITICS
(1982); J. BUDZISZEWSKI, RESURRECTING NATURE (1986); JOHN FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND
NATURAL RIGHTS (1980); ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIvIL LIBERTIES AND
PUBLIC MORALITY (1993); NATURAL LAW THEORY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS (Robert P. George
ed., 1992); ROBERT J. HENLE, THE TREATISE ON LAW (1993) (provides detailed commentary on
Aquinas's Treatise on Law); HEINRICH A. ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW: A STUDY IN LEGAL AND
SOCIAL HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY (Thomas R. Hanley trans., Liberty Fund 1998) (1936); Fulvio
di Blasi, Practical Syllogism, Proairesis, and the Virtues: Toward a Reconciliation of Virtue
Ethics andNatural Law Ethics, 2004 NEW THINGS & OLD THINGS 21 (2004); Robert P. George,
Kelsen and Aquinas on "The Natural Law Doctrine," 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1625 (2000);
Christopher Wolfe, Natural Law Liberalism and the Issues Facing Contemporary American
Public Philosophy, http://www.thomasintemational.org/projects/step/essays/wolfe 000.htm (last
visited Dec. 1, 2006).
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object of law; (4) the relationship of human positive law to natural law; and (5)
the philosophy of natural purposes underlying Aquinas's natural law
jurisprudence. The Article concludes that Aquinas's Treatise on Law, and
particularly his definition of law, may provide a sound philosophical basis for
recovering a "common sense" jurisprudence.
III. JURISPRUDENCE AS "CYNICAL ACID"
A. Skepticism and Cynicism in Academia
Skepticism, cynicism, and nihilism in legal education seem to be part of a
larger philosophical trend, particularly in academia. It is not unusual in elite
institutions of higher learning in the United States for scholars or even entire
academic departments to devote themselves to debunking or eliminating the
very object of their chosen discipline. In some cases religious studies reduce
faith in God to a sociological or psychological phenomenon to be explained
away scientifically; 4 philosophy favors analysis of language over discovery of
truth about being; 15 psychology explains away intellect and free will;
6
anthropology, sociology, and "sociobiology" reject the essential differences
between human beings and animals;17 literary theory de-constructs literary texts
to reveal political subtext; 8 and economics and political science reduce any
concept of the public good or the nature of political life to quantified analysis of
competing subjective interests.19 Even the natural sciences, historically, have
discounted the reality of the objects of our common experience in favor of
reductionist explanations.20
14. See generally DONALD WIEBE, THE POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS STUDIES: THE CONTINUING
CONFLICT WITH THEOLOGY IN THE ACADEMY (1999).
15. See generally MORTIMER J. ADLER, TEN PHILOSOPHICAL MISTAKES 81 (1985)
(describing the tendency in twentieth century analytical philosophy to focus on the use of
language as the object of philosophy rather than things communicated by language).
16. The schools and texts of psychology and neuroscience that assume that the "psyche"
(Greek for "soul") can be explained solely in terms of brain chemistry or irrational urges are too
numerous to cite.
17. See, e.g., EDWARD 0. WILSON, SOCIOBIOLOGY: THE NEW SYNTHmSIS (1975). See
generally DENNIS BONNETrE, ORIGIN OF THE HUMAN SPECIES 65-110 (2003) (discussing
scientific attempts to reduce human language and rationality to animal nature).
18. See, e.g., FISH, supra note 5.
19. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER& PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION (1991).
20. See generally Mortimer Adler, The Questions Science Cannot Answer, BULLETIN OF THE
ATOMIC SCIENTISTS XIII, April 1957, available at http://radicalacademy.com/
aldersciencequestions.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2006); Leon Kass, The Permanent Limitations of
Biology, in LIFE, LIBERTY, AND THE DEFENSE OF DIGNITY (2002); LEON KASS, TOWARD A MORE
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The common element in these disciplines is that they limit the object of
study to a narrow, often quantifiable range of phenomena that can be studied
using certain empirical methods. They dismiss much of our common
experience and received opinions as irrelevant to the scientific enterprise. For
the limited purposes of scientific inquiry, it may be entirely appropriate for
some of these disciplines, particularly the natural sciences and economics, to
focus narrowly on certain types of phenomena. The problem arises when the
empirical conclusions based on a narrow subset of human experience are
universalized and proclaimed to be the whole truth about reality, nature, and the
human person.
B. Skepticism and Cynicism about Law
The study of law is not immune to the trend of self-negating scholarship.
Elite law schools sometimes teach that law is anything other than what common
sense seems to say it is (or, at least, should be). Law is nothing but, variously,
commands backed by threats,21 a prediction of what judges will do,22 a by-
product of "what the judge had for breakfast, 23 or a mask for entrenched class
interests.24 The notion of a statute as a clear rule that means what it says is
wholly illusory25 because language is not a reliable vehicle for the
communication of objective meaning.26 Absent objective meaning, the
advocate or activist "simply beats the text into a shape which will serve his own
purpose." 27 Due to the plasticity of language, the notion that there could be
NATURAL SCIENCE: BIOLOGY AND HUMAN AFFAIRS (1985); ERNST MAYR, THIs Is BIOLOGY: THE
SCIENCE OF THE LIVING WORLD (1997) (arguing that the phenomena of biology cannot be
explained solely in terms of chemistry and physics); R.F. Hassing, Wholes, Parts, and the Laws
of Motion, 6 NATURE & Sys. 195 (1984). Of course, it must be conceded that scientific
reductionism has resulted in many technical wonders and mathematically elegant models of
empirical data.
21. HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 61 (Anders Wedberg trans., Law
Book Exchange 1949) (1945).
22. See K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 12 (1960)
("What [judges and other] officials do is, to my mind, the law itself"); Holmes, supra note 10,
at 461 (defining law as "prophecies of what the courts will do in fact ... ").
23. See JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 161-
62 (1950) (stating that law is ultimately indeterminate and reducible to "non-rational, non-
logical" factors, such as what the judge had for breakfast on the morning the case was decided).
24. See Horwitz, supra note 4, at 100-01.
25. HART, supra note 8, at 136 (describing a false dilemma posed by critics of formalism:
"Either rules are what they would be in the formalist's heaven and they bind as fetters bind; or
there are no rules, only predictable decisions or patterns of behaviour [sic].").
26. See Horwitz, supra note 4.
27. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 177 (1988) (quoting RICHARD RORTY,
[Vol. 1: 1
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"one right answer" in any case is dismissed as hopelessly naive.2 What H.L.A.
Hart termed the "internal aspect" of legal rules-law as experienced by those
who obey or apply the law-is often rejected as a legitimate basis for a
scientific jurisprudence that should be limited to empirical observation of the
law as mere patterns of behavior.
29
Even the traditional, so-called "Socratic" method of American law schools
(albeit effective for training zealous advocates) presents law as the product of
manipulation,3 ° presenting the law as, at best, a means of maximizing economic
productivity or a tool for achieving justice for oppressed classes. At worst, it is
nothing but the technical means for sophistry or "intellectual prostitution."
Thus, in this skeptical, reductionist, cynical view, the common-sense notion of
law as a clear directive of duly authorized lawmakers to achieve the good of the
whole community is unscientific wishful thinking.
The law is not always clear. There are various reasons for this lack of
clarity. First, general statutory rules are not always simple to apply to specific
situations. Hart gives the example of an ordinance providing: "no vehicles
allowed in the park., 31 In the case of a private automobile, the meaning of the
ordinance is clear, but what about a municipal grounds-keeping truck, or a
motor scooter, bicycle, or pair of roller skates? 32 Hart uses this as an example
of what he calls the "open texture" of language.33 Compounding the problem
of ambiguity, much of the statutory law today is drafted in an attempt to address
extremely technical issues in areas such as economics, engineering, chemistry,
and accounting among others. Because the drafters are either lawyers who are
not experts or experts who are not lawyers, the results are often ambiguous. In
some cases, even the lawyers are not fully aware of the precedential,
constitutional, and jurisdictional context in which new law will be inserted.
Because of the inherent ambiguity caused by such a drafting scheme,
unintended consequences or judicial modifications often result.
A third reason for statutory ambiguity is that much legislative language is--
whether by neglect or design-imprecise or even sloppy. The reality of the
CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM 151 (1982)).
28. See generally OBJEcTIVTY IN LAW AND MORALS (Brian Leiter ed., 2001).
29. HART, supra note 8, at 55-60 (comparing the internal aspect of legal rules with external
aspect consisting of "regular uniform behavior which an observer could record.").
30. See, e.g., RiCHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 77,
292 (1999).
31. HART, supra note 8, at 125.
32. Id. at 123.
33. Id. at 120-32 (because of the legislature's relative "ignorance of fact" and
"indeterminacy of aim," the language of law has an "open texture" which must be supplemented
by the courts and officials in particular cases).
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legislative process is often far removed from the ideal of a rational process
guided by prudence and based on thorough legislative fact-gathering.3 4 The
language is often negotiated at the last minute, in the dead of night, between
well-intended staff whose first priority is to "make a deal" to allow legislation
to move forward. The clich6 that law is like making sausage is frequently, and
perhaps unavoidably, true at many levels. And yet, regardless of the
ambiguities, persistent in our experience of law are the notions that the law has
determinate meaning, that there is an ascertainable legislative intent (or at least
an ascertainable zone of delegated rule-making authority to an executive
agency), and that the law is for the good of the public. The reason for these
notions may be because it would be very difficult to operate a legal system on
the explicit premise that law is meaningless, infinitely malleable, or a massive
fraud perpetrated on the public.
Despite the fact that democracy and the rule of law are almost universally
celebrated, modem schools of cynical jurisprudence sometimes deny the very
possibility of a rule of law or recoil at the notion that the people should
determine the laws of the land through their elected representatives. If law is
intrinsically indeterminate and language inherently unreliable, then the rule of
law is an illusion. Law becomes whatever the adjudicators say it is or a mask
for political willfulness and entrenched class interests. 4  Moreover,
"enlightened" judges are better equipped to protect the autonomy of the
individual against the prejudices of elected legislatures.
C. Moral Nihilism and Amoral Jurisprudence
The relationship between law and morality is often even less clear than the
relationship between law and legislative intent. Thoughtful citizens in a
democratic society frequently disagree about particular moral matters. Some of
these matters pertain to sexuality-related practices that have been condemned
by traditional religions, such as adultery or abortion. Partly because there is so
much disagreement over these and other matters, skeptical philosophers have
34. At best, according to Yves Simon, "legal formulas are the work of a legislative
prudence and their determination has been worked out by the sensible, the dependable
inclinations of experienced and well-intentioned persons." YvEs R. SIMON, THE TRADITION
OF NATURAL LAW: A PHILOsoPHER's REFLECTIONS 86 (Vukan Kuic ed., Fordham University
Press 1992) (1965).
35. Echoing Marx's claim that "your jurisprudence is but the will of your class made into a
law for all," one contemporary theorist explains that "neutrality can only be defined with
reference to an existing order under which the beneficiaries of prior injustice are able to
entrench themselves by initially defining those entitlements." Horwitz, supra note 4, at 100-01.
See also KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS, MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY 26
(Frederick Engels ed., Int'l Publishers 2004) (1948).
[Vol. 1: 1
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long assumed that there is no knowable, universal moral order that can
legitimately form the basis for our laws. "Legal positivists" deny any necessary
connection between law and morality. "You can't legislate morality!" seems to
be a common assumption among law students.
In law schools today, the concept of natural law as understood by Aquinas,
or, to a degree, by English jurists Fortescue, Hooker, or Blackstone, is
frequently either ignored or completely misunderstood, or is simply unknown.
3 6
The term "natural law" often means either a modem liberal concept of radical
autonomy of the individual that should be imposed by judges,37 an illegitimate
excuse for overriding the will of the popularly elected legislature, or a mask for
pure prejudice against behaviors the natural law proponent does not like.38
D. Neutralizing Cynical Acid
On the basis of such ambiguities of language, politics, and morality, a great
deal of "cynical acid" has corroded common sense notions of law and justice
for centuries. Doctrines of positivism, legal realism, critical legal studies, law
and economics, and various other "isms" have questioned or rejected the
objectivity and moral foundation of law and have either denied the existence of
a common good or hijacked it with various counterfeit or incomplete goods.
These schools of jurisprudence have arguably made powerful critiques of
various naive formalisms of the past, and their cynicism has been based on
substantial empirical evidence. Nevertheless, the very fact that people persist in
speaking and acting as if the law had a "formal existence, ' 39 and that many
(often competing) "values" pervade the content of our laws, it is reasonable to
ask whether so much cynicism, skepticism, and nihilism can really provide a
complete or true account of the law and what the law aspires to be.
Although much in modem jurisprudence deserves criticism, we need not
draw an entirely pessimistic picture of contemporary jurisprudence and its
36. A Federalist Society debate on "natural law" held at the University of Texas School of
Law in 1996 pitted conservative Lino Graglia (opposing natural law) against liberal Sanford
Levinson (favoring natural law). Further confusing the debate was that conservative and noted
critic of evolutionary "naturalism" Philip Johnson of Berkeley law school rounded out the pro-
natural law team, while a liberal law professor completed the anti-natural law team. Brilliant
scholars all of them, each held an entirely different view of what natural law means. See
discussion infra Parts IV.C and IV.D regarding conservative and liberal views of natural law.
37. See, e.g., RONALD DwORKiN, LAw's EMPIRE (1986) (arguing thatjudges should interpret
the law in the way that results in the most moral outcome according to certain principles of
liberty).
38. See Gewertz, supra note 7.
39. See FISH, supra note 5, at 141-79 (rejecting formalism in an essay entitled "The Law
Wishes to Have a Formal Existence").
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effects. Fortunately, academic jurisprudence, particularly the more extreme
varieties, seems to be largely ignored in the actual practice of law and the work
ofmostjudges. ° To the extent that "ideas have consequences," even some bad
ideas have had good effects. To their credit, the most cynical schools of
jurisprudence have exposed the weaknesses and inconsistencies of earlier
schools of jurisprudence that were based on Classical Liberalism, an overly
rigid textual literalism, and a mechanistic philosophy of nature and
knowledge. 41 The point of this Article is to help recover a more resilient and
practical jurisprudence that accepts the limitations of law without falling into
interpretive skepticism, political cynicism, or moral nihilism. The perennial
philosophy of Aquinas may be the key to such recovery, although many
questions must be addressed to make such recovery legitimate and persuasive.
IV. FIVE THEMES
A. Rule of Law
This part addresses two issues: (1) whether a rule of law is better than a rule
of men; and (2) whether laws should be made by legislatures or judges.
1. The Rule of Law Versus the Rule of Men
In addressing the nature of law, a threshold question arises: should there be
laws at all? Would it be better to be ruled by an all-powerful King or by wise
men, who can evaluate, Solomon-like, each case and apply unwritten principles
ofjustice for the best possible outcome? For Americans, it may seem obvious
that our system of government is essentially a rule of laws not of men and that
such rule of law is superior to the alternative, the arbitrary rule of an unjust
King. As Thomas Paine declared, "[T]he world may know, that so far as we
approve of monarchy, that in America the law is king. For as in absolute
governments the king is law, so in free countries the law ought to be king; and
there ought to be no other. '4
2
Thomas Paine stated the principle of the rule of law as if it were an
American invention. His view is consistent with the popular mythology that
modem democracy, human rights, and limited government are purely modem
(i.e., post-"Enlightemnent") inventions. It is sometimes assumed that medieval
40. HART, supra note 8, at 56-60 (comparing the internal aspect of legal rules with external
aspect consisting of "regular uniform behavior which an observer could record").
41. See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach (1935),
reprinted in AMERicAN LEGAL REALISM (William W. Fisher Ill et al. eds., 1993) (rejecting
"'mechanical jurisprudence[,]' . . . legal magic and word-jugglery").
42. THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 40 (Barnes & Noble Books 1995).
[Vol. 1: 1
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jurisprudence and political theory consisted of, at best, an elaborate apology for
benevolent dictatorship or the "divine right of kings," or, at worst, a footnote to
the ignorance and cruelty of the "Dark Ages.' 43
Although it is true that there was no such thing as a nation-state or liberal
democracy in Aquinas's time, his teaching on the rule of law is surprisingly
both familiar and fresh. In his discussion of human positive law, Aquinas poses
a similar question, "Whether it was useful for laws to be framed by men?""
Drawing on Aristotle, Aquinas carefully distinguishes between tyrannical
rule-the rule of one man for his own private purposes-and "political rule"-
the rule of (just) laws. 45 Aquinas states matter-of-factly that law is for the
people not for the king. He quotes Isidore, "A law is an ordinance of the
people whereby something is sanctioned by the Elders together with the
Commonalty.",46 Because law pertains to the common good, "to order anything
to the common good, belongs either to the whole people, or to someone who is
the viceregent of the whole people. ' 47 Granted, one or more members of the
community are charged with making the laws, i.e., "a public personage who has
care of the whole people: since in all other matters the directing of anything to
the end concerns him to whom the end belongs."
' 4
2. Judges or Legislatures?
Aquinas also distinguishes between rule by judges and rule by laws. Of
particular relevance to contemporary debate over the role ofjudges, he makes
clear that the role ofjudges is to apply the law not to legislate. Even with regard
to ensuring the consistency of human positive law with natural law, he strongly
suggests that this task is for the legislature not for judges. 49 This raises many
43. The notion of a"divine right of kings" was not so much a medieval doctrine as it was an
Enlightenment theory used to justify the despotic rule of the first modem nation states. Most
prominently, Jacques-Benigne Bossuet articulated the theory as a justification of the absolute
monarchy of King Louis XIV of France in the seventeenth century. Bossuet's theory was
antithetical to Aquinas's doctrines of the rule of law and primacy of natural law as checks on the
authority of individual men. See generally HAROLD BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE
FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1983).
44. AQUINAS, supra note 1, at Q. 95, art. 1.
45. See Sean B. Cunningham Note, Is Originalism "Political"?, 1 TEX. REV. L. & POL.
149, 174 (1997).
46. AQUINAS, supra note 1, at Q. 90, art. 3, c.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Russell Hittinger, Natural Law in the Positive Laws, 55 REV. POL. 5, 22 (1993)
(arguing that, as a matter of natural justice, the judge should defer to the lawgiver on matters
of natural law); Russell Hittinger, Distinguishing Between Constitutional Art and Morals, 4
HeinOnline -- 1 Liberty U. L. Rev. 83 2006
LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
questions. What is the obligation of the judge to enforce an unjust law?
Should judges second guess the discretion of regulators on matters implicating
natural law? Are modem legislatures better suited than judges to make law?
How, if at all, can Aquinas's jurisprudence be reconciled with the Anglo-
American tradition of common law jurisprudence, which is based on judge-
made law?
Anticipating some of these questions, Aquinas is clear that the caretaker of
the community is primarily a legislator not a judge. He considers the objection
that "it would have been better for the execution ofjustice to be entrusted to the
decision of judges, than to frame laws in addition. 50  Five-hundred years
before the drafting of Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution, 51 Aquinas drew a
sharp and principled distinction between the role of the legislative and judicial
functions: "it is better that all things be regulated by law, than left to be
decided by judges .... He gives three reasons for this distinction. First,
"because it is easier to find a few wise men competent to frame right laws, than
to find the many who would be necessary to judge aright of each single case. 53
This reason may not be very persuasive today, but a related point is that it is
certainly more efficient and fair to have written laws rather than leave the law
entirely to the discretion ofjudges and other officials. Second, "because those
who make laws consider long beforehand what laws to make; whereas
judgment on each single case has to be pronounced as soon as it arises: and it
is easier for man to see what is right, by taking many instances into
consideration, than by considering one solitary fact.",54  This reason is a
common sense observation about the difference between legislative fact-
S. CAL. INTERDIsc. L.J. 567, 571 (1995) (arguing that legislation of natural law precepts is
the function of the legislature, not the judiciary).
50. AQUINAS, supra note 1, at Q. 95, art. 1, obj. 2.
51. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States.... ."), with U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2
(explaining that judicial power extends only to specific "cases" and "controversies").
52. AQUINAS, supra note 1, at Q. 95, art. l, reply 2 (quoting Aristotle, Rhet. i. 1). Aristotle
certainly admits that the difficulty in applying the generalities of written law poses a dilemma:
"[S]ome things can, and other things cannot, be comprehended under the law, and this is the
origin of the vexed question whether the best law or the best man should rule." THE BASIC
WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1203 (Richard McKeon ed., W.D. Ross trans., Random House 1941).
Nevertheless, he recognizes that the judge who has been "trained by the law judges well." Id. at
1203. Moreover, he insists that "justice exists only between men whose mutual relations are
governed by law .... This is why we do not allow a man to rule, but rational principle, because
a man behaves... in his own interests and becomes a tyrant." Id. at 1013.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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gathering, which is an open-ended process, and judicial fact-finding, which is
focused on the particular case at hand.
Third, "because lawgivers judge in the abstract and of future events; whereas
those who sit in judgment judge of things present, towards which they are
affected by love, hatred, or some kind of cupidity; wherefore their judgment is
perverted.""5 This third point relates to democratic legitimacy-moral matters
should be decided by the legislature not by judges on the basis of heart-rending,
extreme cases or of the judge's personal political philosophy. Indeed, Aquinas
argues that a law made by a man who lacks law-making authority is unjust. 56
For these reasons, Aquinas concludes, "[s]ince then the animated justice of the
judge is not found in every man, and since it can be deflected, therefore it was
necessary, whenever possible, for the law to determine how to judge, and for
very few matters to be left to the decision of men. ' 7
Today one could object that the legislature cannot possibly predict all
particular applications of a law in advance. Aquinas anticipates this objection
and concedes that there are gaps to be filled by judges. He formulates the
objection as follows:
[S]ince human actions are about singulars, which are infinite in
number, matter pertaining to the direction of human actions cannot
be taken into sufficient consideration except by a wise man, who
looks into each one of them. Therefore it would have been better
for human acts to be directed by the judgment of wise men, than by
the framing of laws.58
Aquinas replies that "[c]ertain individual facts which cannot be covered by
the law 'have necessarily to be committed to judges,' as the Philosopher
says.., for instance, 'concerning something that has happened or not
happened,' and the like.",
59
55. Id.
56. AQUINAS, supra note 1, at Q. 96, art. 4, c (arguing that a law can be unjust "in respect of
the author, as when a man makes a law that goes beyond the power committed to him").
57. AQUINAS, supra note I, at Q. 95, art. 1, reply 2.
58. Id. at Q. 95, art. 1, obj. 3.
59. Id. at Q. 95, art. I, reply 3 (quoting Aristotle). It may not be too much of an
exaggeration to use the Philosopher's (i.e., Aristotle's) description of the advocates of
despotism to describe many contemporary skeptics: "they maintain that the laws speak only
in general terms, and cannot provide for circumstances; and that for any science to abide by
written rules is absurd." BASIC WORKS, supra note 52, at 1199 (discussing the relative
merits of the rule of the despot and the rule of law). As Yves Simon stated:
A law is a rule and there is nothing more essential to it than the intelligible
features implied in the concept of rule. These include universality and necessity.
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B. Law and Objective Truth: Law Is Intelligible and Adequately
Determinate
This section addresses four issues: (1) whether a rule of law requires law to
be intelligible and determinate; (2) Aquinas's common-sense understanding of
legal language; (3) Aquinas's rudimentary "canons" of statutory construction
relating to the common good and the authority of the lawgiver; and (4)
Aquinas's pragmatic, but non-skeptical, "realism" about the shortcomings of
human laws.
1. A Rule of Law Requires Legal Intelligibility and Determinacy
A legal text is "intelligible" if it effectively communicates the intent of the
lawgiver to the public and the officials who are charged with applying it. If a
law "says what it means and means what it says," it is intelligible. Determinacy
is the related notion that, in any given case, there is "one right answer.'"
Obviously not every law is clear on its face, and even a seemingly clear law
may admit of more than one reasonable interpretation in hard cases.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to conceive of a rule of law unless there can be laws
(i.e., legal texts) that can reliably communicate coherent policies in a manner
that can be fairly applied to diverse circumstances.
If, as legal skeptics often suggest, law is not intelligible and determinate,
there can be no rule of law in the sense described by Aristotle, Aquinas, or
Thomas Paine. One contemporary legal philosopher poses the problem as
follows:
If singular legal propositions have no truth-value antecedent to
judicial decision, judges cannot be obligated to discover such truths,
nor can they in fact be doing so. Rather, they are free to make it up
as they go along, without possibility of mistake. Such unrestricted
judicial freedom is compatible neither with the idea that we are
governed by the decisions of the majority of us, as expressed by our
elected representatives, nor with the idea that ours is a government
of laws and not of men .... 6
To be sure, both of these features admit of degrees: a rule can be more or less
universal and more or less necessary.... Between law and action there always is
a space to be filled by decisions which cannot be written into law.
SIMON, supra note 34, at 83.
60. See OBJECTIVITY IN LAW AND MoRALs, supra note 28.
61. Michael S. Moore, Pre-Modernism, Modernism, andPost-Modernism: The Plain Truth
About Legal Truth, 26 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 23, 30 (2003).
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2. Legal Language and Objective Truth
For Aquinas, a law is a "rule and measure of human acts." 62 Specifically, it
is a rule "whereby man is induced to act or is restrained from acting: for 'lex'
[law] is derived from 'ligare' [to bind], because it binds one to act."63 This
understanding of law as a binding rule requires a common sense understanding
of language as being capable of reliably communicating truth.
Aquinas apparently assumes that language can (at least for the most part)
reliably communicate directives of reason in a manner that can be understood
by the public and applied consistently in a variety of particular cases. His
discussion of promulgation, one of the four elements in his definition of law,
shows his confidence in written language. He considers the objection that,
because promulgation takes place only in the present, a law that is promulgated
at one point in time does not bind in the future. His response presupposes the
intelligibility of language over time, "[t]he promulgation that takes place now,
extends to future time by reason of the durability of written characters, by
which means it is continually promulgated." 64
Aquinas's common sense understanding of legal language is consistent with
his philosophy of knowledge and being. For Aquinas, truth is defined as the
conformity of the mind to reality.65 He is neither a skeptic-who denies that
truth is knowable-nor a "constructivist"--who contends that the only relevant
truth is an ever-evolving network of relationships our minds weave together out
66of experience. His understanding of legal language also presupposes a
common intellectual culture in which every law student was trained in classical
grammar, logic, and rhetoric.
3. Principles for Statutory Interpretation
Although Aquinas had confidence in written language, his jurisprudence is
not a rigid formalism insisting that a single right answer to every legal dispute
is reachable by deduction from the text of the applicable statutes. He
acknowledges that, because laws are formulated in general terms, they are
sometimes either ambiguous or not properly applicable to every situation. He
does not therefore jump to the conclusion that law is inherently indeterminate,
fraudulent, or limitlessly malleable for political purposes. In short, he accepts
the formality of law without being a formalist, bases his jurisprudence on reality
62. AQUINAS, supra note 1, at Q. 90, art. 1, c.
63. Id.
64. Id. at Q. 90, art. 4, reply 3.
65. JACQUES MARITAIN, THE DEGREES OF KNOWLEDGE 93 (1995).
66. Moore, supra note 61.
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without being a legal realist, and accepts the practical difficulties of
interpretation and adjudication without being a pragmatist. His jurisprudence
may be regarded as naive by adherents to such legal theories as legal realism,
law and economics, critical legal studies, modernism, post-modernism, and
various other quasi-scientific "isms," but it is not clear whether any of these
theories necessarily refute or represent progress beyond Aquinas's relatively
common-sense understanding of law.67
Aquinas addresses the difficulties of statutory construction and application in
a principled way. He does not articulate a systematic theory of statutory
construction, provide a catalog of canons of construction, or set forth anything
like a modem theory of, say, constitutional or administrative law.
Rather, his primary principle of statutory construction is deference to
legislative authority. If there is any doubt about the meaning of a law, the judge
should take into account the intent of the legislature: "Hilary says (De Trin. iv):
'The meaning of what is said is according to the motive for saying it: because
things are not subject to speech, but speech to things.' Therefore we should
take account of the motive of the lawgiver, rather than of his very words."6 If a
particular interpretation of the law gives rise to a questionable result the
interpreter should, as a last resort, attempt to determine the legislature's intent:
He who follows the intention of the lawgiver, does not interpret
the law simply; but in a case in which it is evident, by reason of the
manifest harm, that the lawgiver intended otherwise. For if it be a
matter of doubt, he must either act according to the letter of the law,
69
or consult those in power.
Aquinas is not necessarily taking a side in the contemporary debate over
whether judges should consult legislative history.70 It is not clear how a federal
judge or regulator in the United States can, or should, "consult" the Congress to
67. The brilliance and analytical force of these various methods ofjurisprudence is not in
question. The problem begins when any method begins to assert that the law is "nothing but"
this or that, contrary to the full range of common experience and opinion that forms our
concepts of law and legality. The fact that we believe, speak, and organize our communal life
around the concepts of intelligible and authoritative rules set forth for a common good suggests
that the definition of law should include concepts of reason, legitimacy, generality, publicity,
and goodness.
68. AQUNAS, supra note 1, at Q. 96, art. 6, c.
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 12, at 17, 29-37 (rejecting the use of legislative history
because "it is simply incompatible with democratic government... to have the meaning of a law
determined by what the lawgiver meant, rather than by what the lawgiver promulgated.... It is
the law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver.").
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clarify the meaning of an enactment. Perhaps it was possible in the thirteenth
century to consult the legislature to determine its un-promulgated intent.
Aquinas seems to presume that the legislature has an ascertainable intent,
which should take precedence over a judge's preferred outcome or an absurd
result.
4. Aquinas's Non-Skeptical "Realism"
At this point, a skeptic may protest that Aquinas's common sense approach
is unscientific, begs the central questions of modem jurisprudence, and ignores
800 years of philosophical "progress." However, it may be that the skeptic
expects either too much or too little from the subject matter of law. Ifajurist at
first demands that there be "one right answer" in every case, achievable by
logical deduction from the law and the evidence, he will be disappointed, and
may become a skeptic, who believes there are no right answers. For Aquinas,
by contrast, the fact that truth in legal matters is not always obvious, and may
even be unattainable in many cases, does not mean that there is no truth in the
law or that it is not worth pursuing. As Chesterton observed, "[i]f a thing is
worth doing, it is worth doing badly.'
' 1
For Aquinas, men are not angels-not only in the ethical sense as James
Madison later observed, but also in epistemological and ontological terms. For
Aquinas, angels have direct intuitive knowledge of reality, unmediated by sense
impressions, time or space. 7' Modem philosophy is impatient, demanding
angelic knowledge, accepting only clear and distinct ideas as legitimate objects
of knowledge, and regarding human knowing as a constructive activity of the
mind rather than a conforming of the mind to reality.73 For human beings,
knowledge of reality is possible, but requires time, observation, and reasoning,
and may sometimes fail. "'We must not seek the same degree of certainty in all
things' .... Consequently in contingent matters, such as natural and human
things, it is enough for a thing to be certain, as being true in the greater number
71. G. K. CHESTERTON, WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE WORLD (1910), quoted in Antonin
Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 863 (1989). It must be
conceded that, if the "rules" for how laws are construed are fundamentally in dispute, the
practical effect is that the laws, as construed, do not fit Aquinas's definition as well. Several
jurists and scholars have called for a revival of the study of canons of construction, and even
a formal regularization of rules of construction, whether through a restatement or even by the
enactment of Federal rules. See, e.g., SCALiA, supra note 12; Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz,
Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARv. L. REv. 2085 (2002); O'Connor, supra
note 9, at 334.
72. See JACQUES MARITAIN, THREE REFORMERS: LUTHER, DESCARTES, ROUSSEAU (1970).
73. Id.
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of instances, though at times and less frequently it fail." 74 Accordingly law has
limits.
The practical reason is concerned with practical matters, which are singular
and contingent: but not with necessary things, with which the speculative
reason is concerned. Wherefore human laws cannot have that inerrancy that
belongs to the demonstrated conclusions of sciences. Nor is it necessary for
every measure to be altogether unerring and certain, but according as it is
possible in its own particular genus.7
5
If there can be a science of statutory construction, it will necessarily be an
imperfect science. However, a realist epistemology, common standards of logic
and grammar, and careful study of the "common law" of statutory construction
may go a long way towards an interpretive regime worthy of the rule of law.
C. Common Good
This section addresses four issues: (1) whether law is for the common good,
as distinct from merely private goods; (2) whether the common good can trump
the letter of the law; (3) the relationship between common good and the good of
individual persons; (4) whether a "thick" theory of the common good is
compatible with limited government and civil liberties.
1. Law Is for the Common Good
Aquinas wisely adopted a common-sense account of the relationship
between law and the good of society. He takes the ordination to the common
good as an essential element of law and that the common good is ascertainable.
Quoting the seventh-century philosopher Isidore, Aquinas states that "laws are
enacted for no private profit, but for the common benefit of the citizens.,
76
The notion that laws of the country or state should be for the common
benefit of the citizens comports with common sense. Even when concerns are
raised that the legislative process is controlled by special interests, the public
nevertheless apparently assumes that laws should serve the common good.
Many citizens might agree with St. Augustine that without justice, "what are
kingdoms but gangs of criminals on a large scale?" 77 They would also agree
that laws prohibiting murder, theft, fraud, and telemarketing on numbers listed
on the federal "do-not-call list" all serve the common good. Even murderers,
74. AQUINAS, supra note 1, at Q. 96, art. 1, reply 3.
75. Id. at Q. 91, art. 3.
76. Id. at Q. 90, art. 2.
77. 4 ST. AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD 139 (Penguin 1986).
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thieves, "con artists," and telemarketers benefit from these laws when they are
not individually profiting from their anti-social actions.
If a law does not serve the common good, it is unjust, and thereby
illegitimate.
[L]aws may be unjust.., by being contrary to human good...
either in respect of the end, as when an authority imposes on his
subjects burdensome laws, conducive, not to the common good, but
rather to his own cupidity or vainglory ... or in respect of form, as
when burdens are imposed unequally on the community, although
with a view to the common good. The like are acts of violence
rather than laws; because as Augustine says (De. Lib. Arb. i, 5), a
law that is not just, seems to be no law at all."78
2. Whether the Common Good Can Trump the Letter of the Law
For Aquinas, a law can also be unjust if it is contrary to the common good in
a particular case. It would be impossible for a legislature to foresee all
particular situations. "No man is so wise as to be able to take account of every
single case; wherefore he is not able sufficiently to express in words all those
things that are suitable for the end he has in view., 79 Accordingly, the
lawmaker's task is to formulate general rules not to anticipate every particular
situation. "[E]ven if a lawgiver were able to take all the cases into
consideration, he ought not to mention them all, in order to avoid confusion:
but should frame the law according to that which is of most common
occurrence."
80
Occasionally, a general rule could have absurd or harmful consequences
under certain unforeseen circumstances. Aquinas poses the question,
"[w]hether he who is under a law may act beside the letter of the law?""
Aquinas gives a hypothetical situation in which a law requires keeping the city
78. AQUINAS, supra note 1, at Q. 96, art. 4, c. This does not mean that a citizen has an
obligation to disobey every unjust law:
Wherefore such laws do not bind in conscience, except perhaps in order to avoid
scandal or disturbance, for which cause a man should even yield his right,
according to Matthew 40:41, "If a man ... take away thy coat, let go thy cloak
also unto him; and whosoever will force thee one mile, go with him other two."
Id.
79. Id. at Q. 96, art. 6, reply 3.
80. Id.
81. Id. at Q. 96, art. 6, c.
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gate closed at night. However, what if the city's retreating defenders return at
midnight and must be re-admitted to the city immediately to avoid death?
Aquinas reasons that, in certain circumstances, the common good must trump
the letter of the law.82
This pragmatic principle is not a license for willfulness, and it is distinct
from the notion of civil disobedience against an inherently unjust law. The idea
of an ad hoc appeal to an unwritten concept of the common good may seem
troubling to a strict positivist or formalist or may embolden a skeptic to argue
that judges should have unlimited powers of equity.8 3 But who would deny
that, in the event of a hurricane or terrorist attack, certain laws and regulations
could legitimately be suspended at once to avoid further destruction?
3. The Common Good and the Good of Individual Persons
What is the content of this common good? The highest good of an
individual human person is happiness and, ultimately, eternal happiness with
God. This happiness consists of virtue and progress toward the realization of
man's true nature, including contemplation of truth, not merely of pleasure or
satisfaction.8 4 The "common good" is the good of the individuals in the
community to the extent that such good can be pursued as a common objective
through a coordinated effort.85 Aquinas's description of the common good is
very general:
Now the common good comprises many things. Wherefore law
should take account of many things, as to persons, as to matters, and
as to times. Because the community of the state is composed of
many persons; and its good is procured by many actions; nor is it
established to endure for only a short time, but to last for all time by
the citizens succeeding one another .... 86
82. See id. ("Wherefore if a case arise wherein the observance of that law would be hurtful
to the general welfare, it should not be observed.").
83. See Matthew Schultz, Comment, Equitable Repudiation: Toward a Doctrine of
Fallible Perfection in Statutory Interpretation, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 303 (2001) (citing
Aristotle and Aquinas in support of the proposition that judges should have broad authority to
repudiate statutes and that statutory objectivity is a myth).
84. Contra THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 160 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Books 1968)
(1651) ("[T]he Felicity of this life, consisteth not in the repose of a mind satisfied. For there is
no such Finis ultimus, (utmost ayme,) nor Summum Bonum, (greatest Good,) as is spoken of in
the Books of the old Morall [sic] Philosophers.").
85. See SIMON, supra note 34, at 86-92. Law cannot command every virtue or forbid every
vice. Thus, the common good is limited in scope.
86. AQUINAS, supra note 1, at Q. 96, art. 1, c.
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Despite common sense, modem philosopher-jurists of both the Left and the
Right have expressed skepticism about the concept of a common good,
rejecting the concept as at best, delusional or at worst, proto-totalitarian.
Anglo-American political philosophy, specifically Classical Liberalism in its
various forms, regards the common good as nothing more than the composite of
the individual goods of survival and pleasure and economic benefit, or the
greatest good for the greatest number. By contrast, certain totalitarian doctrines
tend to regard the common good as something greater than, and external to, the
good of all the persons who comprise the community.
87
Classical Liberalism in general struggles with the very idea of a common
good as being anything other than the maximization of individual profits and
pleasures (utilitarianism's greatest good for the greatest number of people), a
very thin concept of a social compact to support commerce and private property
(Locke), or a truce against what would otherwise be violence and chaos
(Hobbes's "State of Warre"). Classical Liberal political philosophy assumes,
contrary to Aristotle and Aquinas, that political community is not natural. The
"State of Nature" is a fictional "State of Warre" in which there are only
autonomous individuals. 88 The misery, poverty, and violence of the State of
Nature provide an incentive for miserable individuals to enter a social compact
for their mutual advantage. 89 The only natural law is the law of the individual
self interest. The only common good is thus an artificial good that is reducible
to the maximization of the individual goods. An extreme variant of this
conception of the common good is the greatest-good-for-the-greatest-number
utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham. This artificial conception of the common
good is fundamentally different from Aquinas's understanding. For Aquinas,
political life is natural. The State of Nature is nowhere to be found in our
common experience. 9°
"Conservative" public choice theory, a derivative of Classical Liberalism,
argues that legislatures act according to a rational calculus of the relative weight
of special interests-the common good or public interest is a fiction.
According to Landes and Posner,
In the economists' version of the interest-group theory of
government, legislation is supplied to groups or coalitions that
87. Yves Simon describes opposite errors: "[Tlhe myth of a common good external to
man and conceived after the pattern of a work of art" and the individualist reduction of the
common good to the "'greatest good of the greatest number."' SIMON, supra note 34, at 107.
88. HOBBES, supra note 84, at 160.
89. "Desire of Ease... disposeth men to obey a common power." Id. at 161.
90. See ADLER, supra note 15 (refuting the doctrine of Hobbes and Locke that political life
is not natural).
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outbid rival seekers of favorable legislation.... Payments take the
form of campaign contributions, votes, implicit promises of future
favors, and sometimes outright bribes. In short, legislation is "sold"
by the legislature and "bought" by the beneficiaries of the
legislation. 91
Conservatives (many of whom are best understood as old-fashioned Classical
Liberals) typically express skepticism toward any concept of public interest,
believing it to be code for some left-wing agenda favored by politically
unaccountable judges or bureaucrats. 92
The notion of a common good is also sometimes associated with an organic
view of the State as something larger than and superior to the good or liberty of
individual persons. Various atheistic or neo-pagan creeds such as Stalinism,
Maoism, Pol Pot, National Socialism, are examples of the horrors wrought by a
Statism that sets itself apart from the good of individual persons. Some
ideologies of racism or ethnic exclusion have used religious texts or traditions
to justify persecution. Certain economic doctrines equate the common good
with maximization of overall wealth, regardless of the effects on the poor and
the weak. In Aquinas's philosophy, the common good is rooted in the good of
individual persons who are social by nature. Following Aquinas's teachings,
the Catholic Church's social doctrine has consistently vindicated the dignity of
the human person as against such claims of State power or ideology.
93
The common good for legal purposes is neither a paradise, a monastery, nor
a highly regimented reform school. Nor is it a machine-like social unit like a
military unit or a sports team trained to operate as an instrument for the
achievement of a specific goal extrinsic to the members of the unit. The
common good does not consist of victorious class struggle, imperial conquest,
or building pyramids. It must be emphatically stated that Aquinas's philosophy
does not sacrifice the dignity of the individual to a proto-totalitarian or
communistic conception of the State.
91. See FARBAR & FRICKEY, supra note 19, at 15 (1950) (citing William Landes & Richard
Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & EcoN. 371, 371
(1983)).
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Pius XI, Mit Brennender Sorge (1937), http://www.vatican.va/holyfather/
pius xi/encyclicals/documents/hf p-xi enc 14031937_mit-brennender-sorgeen.html (last
visited Dec. 1, 2006) (denouncing Nazi racism); Pius XI, Divini Redemptoris (1937),
http://www.vatican.va/holyfather/pius xi/encyclicals/documents/hfp-
xi enc-19031937-divini-redemptoris-en.html (last visited Dec. 2,2006) (denouncing "atheistic
communism"). See generally RICHARD W. ROUSSEAU, HUMAN DIGNITY AND THE COMMON
GOOD: THE GREAT SOCIAL ENCYCLICALS FROM LEO XIII TO JOHN PAUL H (2002).
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4. Common Good and Limited Government
Aquinas was not a libertarian.9 4 The notions of either an absolute right of
the individual to do as he or she pleases or a right to do wrong are incompatible
with Aquinas's natural law ethics. The pursuit of happiness for Aquinas was
the pursuit of specific goods that are best for human nature. The purpose of the
state and its laws is, in part, to compel good acts and forbid bad acts according
to what is good or bad by nature.
What is the role of American-style individual liberty in a State that operates
according to Aquinas's philosophy? Aquinas's natural law legal principles are
compatible with American traditions of civil liberty in two ways.95 First, as
Robert Bork explains, individual liberty in the United States was historically
understood to be enjoyed in a context of common moral standards upheld by
vigorous institutions of civil society. The problem is that our liberties were
grounded in an incomplete philosophy from the start. If the principles of this
libertarian philosophy are played out to their logical extreme, the result is a
breakdown in civil society in favor of a chaotic anti-society of atomistic
individuals.
We can now see the tendency of the Enlightenment, the Declaration of
Independence, and [Mill's] On Liberty. Each insisted on the expanding liberty
of the individual and each assumed that order was not a serious problem and
could be left, pretty much, to take care of itself. And, for a time, order did seem
to take care of itself. But that was because the institutions-family, church,
school, neighborhood, inherited morality-remained strong. The constant
underestimation of their value and the continual pressure for more individual
autonomy necessarily weakened the restraints on individuals. The ideal slowly
became the autonomous individual who stood in an adversarial relationship to
any institution or group that attempted to set limits to acceptable thought and
behavior.
96
Bork, without expressly referencing natural law, argues that liberty must be
bounded by substantive moral principle. "Our modem, virtually unqualified,
enthusiasm for liberty forgets that liberty can only be 'the space between the
walls,' the walls of morality and law based upon morality. It is sensible to
94. The term "libertarian" is used in the general sense of an ethical doctrine derived from
classical liberalism that places individual liberty above any substantive conception of what is
good for human beings by nature. See WOLFE, supra note 13 (distinguishing "antiperfectionist
liberalism," libertarianism, and "radical or post-modem (super) liberalism").
95. See GEORGE, supra note 13; JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS:
CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION (1986); WOLFE, supra note 13.
96. ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TowARDs GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND
AMERICAN DECLINE 63-64 (1996).
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argue about how far apart the walls should be set, but it is cultural suicide to
demand all space and no walls. 97
Aquinas's political philosophy allows for ample "space between the walls."
The powers of the law to police morality are limited. Although it must serve
the common good, the law's task is not to make everyone virtuous or to bring
about the common good all at once. It need not compel every act of virtue or
ban every act of vice. First, the law can command only those virtues "that are
ordainable to the common good-either immediately, as when certain things
are done directly for the common good-or mediately, as when a lawgiver
prescribes certain things pertaining to good order, whereby the citizens are
directed in the upholding of the common good ofjustice and peace. 98
Similarly, although the Divine law forbids all sins, "human law cannot
punish or forbid all evil deeds: since while aiming at doing away with all evils,
it would do away with many good things, and would hinder the advance of the
common good... .,99 Indeed, punishing every vice may do more harm than
good.100 Thus, prudent lawmakers must legislate with moderation and
tolerance.
D. Natural Law
This section addresses three issues: (1) the relationship between human law,
properly speaking, and a natural moral order prior to human conventions; (2)
the distinction between Aquinas's concept of natural law and a radical
libertarian view of natural law; and (3) the basic content and know-ability of
natural law.
97. Id. at 65.
98. AQUINAS, supra note 1, at Q. 96, art. 3, c.
99. Id. at Q. 91, art. 4, c.
100. As Aquinas stated:
The purpose of human law is to lead men to virtue, not suddenly, but gradually.
Wherefore it does not lay upon the multitude of imperfect men the burdens of
those who are already virtuous, viz. that they should abstain from all evil.
Otherwise these imperfect ones, being unable to bear such precepts, would break
out into yet greater evils: thus it is written (Prov. 30:33): "He that violently
bloweth his nose, bringeth out blood"; and (Mt. 9:17) that if "new wine," i.e.,
precepts of a perfect life, "is put into old bottles," i.e., into imperfect men, "the
bottles break, and the wine runneth out," i.e., the precepts are despised, and those
men, from contempt, break into evils worse still.
Id. at Q. 96, art. 2, reply 2.
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1. Human Law Is Subordinate to Natural Law: "An Unjust Law Is No
Law At All"
The legitimacy of a particular human law depends on whether it comports
with an objective moral order because an unjust law is no law at all.' 01 For
Aquinas, law and morality are inextricably linked, because human laws,
properly speaking, are nothing but specifications of the natural law.'02 He even
seems to say that human positive laws (i.e., statutes and other written rules of
general applicability) are a subset of a larger, unwritten, moral code. He uses
the term "law" analogously to refer to four different kinds of true laws. The
highest kind of law is the immutable Eternal Law which governs the entire
universe. °3 The "natural law" is the "participation of the rational creature" in
the Eternal Law."14 The Divine law is Biblical revelation, consisting of moral
precepts, which are clarifications of the natural law, and ceremonial precepts.0 5
He defines all of these types of law using the same definition drawn from
human experience of human laws. Although the Eternal Law is the most
perfect form of law, the human law is the type that men can most easily
understand from experience.
The natural law meets the definition of law because it is a rational directive
by God for the good of all human kind. Although the natural law by itself is
not promulgated in the same way as human laws, it is "written in our hearts" in
an analogous way. It is the nature of the rational creature, i.e. the human being,
to understand the natural law, not intuitively, but by natural inclination. 106 The
relationship between the natural law promulgated by God and human positive
law promulgated by human lawgivers is that the positive laws are specifications
of the natural law in a political community that are identified by practical
reasoning and promulgated by the authorized lawgiver.
In answer to the question, "Whether there is a human law?" Aquinas
explains that "a law is a dictate of the practical reason." Because practical
101. Id. at Q. 96, art. 4, c. (quoting St. Augustine, "'[A] law that is not just, seems to be no
law at all."') ("lex iniusta non est lex").
102. The natural law is, in turn, a "participation" in the Eternal Law. The term "law" is thus
used analogously.
103. See Q. 93, arts. 4-6 (discussing God's governance of creatures by the Eternal Law).
104. See Q. 91, art. 2; Q. 94 (discussing the natural law).
105. See Q. 91, art. 5; QQ. 98-108 (explaining the precepts of the Old Law and the New
Law).
106. See AQUINAS, supra note 1, at Q. 94, art. 2, c. ("[A]II those things to which man has a
natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good, and consequently as
objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance."). See discussion infra
regarding human teleology in the Part IV.E.3.
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reason is the mode of reason whereby a person knows moral good and evil,
laws are essentially specifications of the natural law.
[W]e conclude that just as, in the speculative reason, from naturally
known indemonstrable principles, we draw the conclusions of the
various sciences, the knowledge of which is not imparted to us by
nature, but acquired by the efforts of reason, so too it is from the
precepts of the natural law, as from general and indemonstrable
principles, that the human reason needs to proceed to the more
particular determinations of certain matters. These particular
determinations, devised by human reason, are called human laws,
provided the other essential conditions of law be observed .... 107
Although the process is analogous to deductive mathematical reasoning, the
"indemonstrable principles" of moral reasoning are very general principles
known by natural inclination, and the process of reasoning to particular
determination is not as easy or reliable as mathematical reasoning.
2. Aquinas's Natural Law Versus Libertarian Natural Rights
Perhaps ironically, when the term "natural law" is discussed in law schools
today, it is often in the context of a debate between what could be called
conservative legal positivism and liberal natural law activism.08 In these
debates, conservatives typically oppose the use of natural law by judges, while
liberals rely on a narrow, radically libertarian form of natural law.
Conservative legal positivism is the view that the law is nothing more than
the command of the sovereign, interpreted in a formalistic manner. Under this
view, morality is irrelevant to the task of the judge.10 9 Any moral content in the
law is front-loaded by the legislature. Only the legislature has standing to
consider moral matters and to determine the policies of the society." This
view is conservative in two respects: (1) it takes a common-sense, traditional
107. Id. at Q. 91, art. 3, c.
108. See, e.g., Ronald A. Dworkin, "Natural" Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165 (1982)
(identifying natural law with a moral philosophy of individual autonomy); POSNER, supra note
30, at 96 (discussing Dworkin's "natural-law theory").
109. See, e.g., Lino A. Graglia, Lawrence v. Texas: Our Philosopher-Kings Adopt
Libertarianism as Our Official National Philosophy and Reject Traditional Morality as a Basis
of Law, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1139, 1140 (2004); Lino A. Graglia, Jaffa's Quarrel With Robert
Bork: Religious Belief Masquerading as Constitutional Argument, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISc. L.J.
705 (1995).
110. See, e.g., Lino A. Graglia, Do Judges Have a Policy-Making Role in the American
System of Government?, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119, 129 (1994).
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view of legal interpretation and the role ofjudges; and (2) at least in the United
States, democratically elected legislatures are often more comfortable with
traditional morality than unelected judges.
By contrast, liberal natural law activism combines skepticism with a radical
vision of a just society as one in which the autonomy of the individual is
realized to the fullest extent. No caricature of this kind of liberalism could state
the matter more starkly than Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in the
Supreme Court's 1992 order in PlannedParenthood ofPennsylvania v. Casey,
"[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.""' Obviously
neither the Constitution nor any statute explicitly provides for an individual
right of self-creation or self-definition, a right to determine the nature of the
universe, a right to determine whether one is human, or whether other members
of the community are human. This concept of natural law is fundamentally
different from Aquinas's concept of natural law. For Aquinas, human nature is
a given. Although he acknowledges that the application of the natural law is
not obvious in every particular instance, he understands that certain acts-such
as murder, rape, and theft-are evils that are contrary to human nature properly
understood.11 2
3. Content and Know-Ability of Natural Law
Today, natural law is usually only discussed in the context of extremely
controversial matters of sexual morality. Rather than engage in reasoned
discussion, opponents of Thomistic natural law sometimes simply state that
because a particular practice they wish to defend has historically been classified
111. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
112. Early modem political philosophers tended to collapse the distinction between human
nature in the classical sense of a normative inclination toward a state of fulfillment of concrete
goods and the empirical "reality" of a human nature as vice-prone, sinful, and self-seeking.
According to Thomas Hobbes, the natural inclination of man is a matter of amoral desire, not of
the attainment of a specified good:
[Tihe Felicity of this life consisteth not in the repose of a mind satisfied. For there
is no such Finis Ultimus (utmost ayme,) or Summum Bonum (greatest good,) as is
spoken of in the Books of the old Morall Philosophers.... Felicity is a continuall
progresse of the desire, from one object to another; the attaining of the former,
being still but the way to the later.
HOBBES, supra note 84, at 160. It is common in our culture to speak of human nature as
describing an inclination towards selfishness, sexual promiscuity, and various desires. For
Aquinas as a theologian, true human nature is wounded, but not destroyed, by original sin. It
makes sense for him to speak of nature in normative terms.
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as a "crime against nature," the concept of natural law is inherently a mask for
hatred or prejudice and cannot be taken seriously.'1 3 Focusing solely on the
most controversial issues obscures the common-sense basis of natural law
reasoning.
Natural law pertains to all morality not just sexual morality. It is commonly
asserted that law and morality should be kept strictly separate, as if
acknowledgement of popularly held moral convictions were tantamount to the
establishment of a theocracy. However, innumerable moral matters are taken
for granted in "civilized" nations but are no less matters of morality. In the
ancient world or in various cultures untouched by the moral teachings of the
great monotheistic religions, many practices that are now almost universally
regarded as abhorrent were tolerated or even encouraged, including infanticide,
summary execution of prisoners of war, rape, slavery, incest, human sacrifice,
cannibalism, revenge killing, polygamy, pederasty, theft, raiding, the killing by
a father of his wife and members of his household, and female genital
mutilation.' 1 4 For example, we have laws against theft, arson, vandalism,
deceptive trade practices, and many other practices that are-perish the
thought-bad for the community. Some of these things have not always been
illegal. Aquinas claims that, although theft is contrary to the natural law, the
"Germans" in his time did not regard theft as immoral." 5 All of these practices
in time, and perhaps with some hypocrisy in individual cases, were condemned
as being contrary to Christianity. It does not therefore follow that laws against
murder and incest make our government a theocracy.
There are also many other equally moral matters about which erstwhile
attackers of natural law ethics frequently address in terms of moral absolutes.
These include matters of civil rights on the basis of race, environmental
degradation, the justice of particular wars, or whether the government should
fund health care for the poor and the elderly. All of these controversial issues
pertain to natural law principles.
Nevertheless, the fact that there are disagreements about what is moral or
immoral is significant for Aquinas. Aquinas readily acknowledges that
identifying the "secondary precepts" of the natural law is hard work, requiring
experience and reasoning. The results vary "on account of the uncertainty of
human judgment, especially on contingent and particular matters, different
113. See Gewertz, supra note 7 (quoting Dershowitz).
114. See, e.g., WARREN H. CARROLL, THE FOUNDING OF CHRISTENDOM 83, 219-20 (1985)
(discussing child sacrifice, infanticide, and temple prostitution among the Canaanites,
Carthaginians, and Greeks).
115. See AQUINAS, supra note 1, at Q. 94, art. 4 (quoting Julius Caesar as stating that
"[G]oods entrusted to another should be restored to their owner."). Cf note 99.
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people form different judgments on human acts; whence also different and
contrary laws result."'" 6  Even when the particulars of natural law are
identifiable by those citizens who are (or believe they are) already virtuous but
not by others, prudence dictates restraint. As discussed above, the purpose of
law is to lead the members of the community to virtue gently, not to root out all
vice or compel virtue.11
7
Aquinas poses the question, "Whether an effect of law is to make men
good?" 1 8 He answers that "the proper effect of law is to lead its subjects to
their proper virtue: and since virtue is 'that which makes its subject good,' it
follows that the proper effect of law is to make those to whom it is given, good,
either simply or in some particular respect." '" 9
The first precept of natural law is do good and avoid evil. 20 This may seem
like a useless tautology, but it is an important point that is consistent with
human experience. It is difficult to conceive of a human being desiring evil for
the sake of evil. Certainly people desire many evil things, whether it be
coveting a neighbor's possessions or spouse, desiring the death or misfortune of
one's enemies, or craving "sinful" desserts are all desired because they will
bring pleasure or power or some other thing that the person desiring regards as
a more desirable good, at least for the moment.
More specific precepts of the natural law are known by certain basic natural
inclinations, ordered by reason.1 21 Human beings, for the most part, naturally
desire to live, be healthy, have families, form communities, and grow in
knowledge of the world, morality, and God. The desires to live, be healthy, and
reproduce are desires we have in common with plants and animals. Family and
community are partly animal and partly rational. Political life, legal structures,
religion, philosophy, and conceptual knowledge are specific to the human being
as a rational animal.
Many positive laws found in legal codes throughout the world are fairly
straightforward reflections of the natural law. Laws forbidding murder and
battery address the natural desire to survive. Laws against theft, rape, and
murder protect harmony and individual dignity within the community. Beyond
these basics, there may be a great deal of controversy about which laws and
policies will best protect and support these natural goods. The goods
themselves, however, and the overarching principle that the integral good of the
116. Id. at Q. 91, art. 4, c.
117. See supra note 100.
118. AQUINAS, supra note 1, at Q. 92, art. 1, c.
119. Id.
120. Id. at Q. 94, art. 2, c.
121. Id.
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human person is to be pursued and evil avoided, remain in the background.
Environmental, food and drug, and other social welfare laws presuppose basic
human inclinations to survival and health.1 22 Laws to punish crime, protect
marriage, ensure religious liberty, and protect private property presuppose
certain human natural goods.
1 23
E. Natural Purposes
This part addresses four issues: (1) the relationship between reason and
natural purposes; (2) Aquinas' "teleological" (i.e., purpose-oriented)
philosophy of nature; (3) human teleology (i.e., the purposes of human nature);
(4) whether there can be a Thomistic theory of natural law without natural
teleology.
1. The Relationship between Law and Natural Purposes
Aquinas states that "[f]aw is a rule and measure of acts, whereby man is
induced to act or is restrained from acting: for lex (law) is derived from ligare
(to bind), because it binds one to act."' 24 However, the essence of law is not
command or compulsion alone, because the "rule and measure of human acts is
the reason, which is the first principle of human acts .... ,125 This language
may seem puzzling. Modem philosophy often reduces reason to a purely
instrumental status, subordinate to a variety of desires. According to David
Hume, "[r]eason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions ....
Aquinas follows Aristotle's teaching that "it belongs to the reason to direct to
,,127the end, which is the first principle in all matters of action .... He is not
referring to any arbitrary end derivative of passions. Rather, the purpose of
reason is to achieve the fulfillment of a knowable natural good. In the case of a
law, the end or purpose is the common good. "Actions are indeed concerned
with particular matters: but those particular matters are referable to the common
122. Such laws may be deeply flawed, premised on an unwarranted optimism about the
ability of government to remedy market failures, or based on unrealistic risk assessments. See,
e.g., ECOLOGY, LIBERTY & PROPERTY: A FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTAL READER (Jonathan H.
Adler ed., 2000). They are, nevertheless, publicly justified in terms of what is "good" for
society in a broadly moral sense.
123. Some such laws may be misguided or wrong, but they are nevertheless justified in terms
of what is good for society.
124. AQUINAS, supra note 1, at Q. 90, art. 1.
125. Id.
126. DAVID HUME, TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 415 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford 1978)
(1740).
127. AQUINAS, supra note 1, at Q. 90, art. 1, c.
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good, not as to a common genus or species, but as to a common final cause,
according as the common good is said to be the common end.' 28 The common
good is, in turn, derived from the natural, and ultimately, supernatural good of
the individual persons, which is happiness or beatitude appropriate to the
rational creature:
Now as reason is a principle of human acts, so in reason itself
there is something which is the principle in respect of all the rest:
wherefore to this principle chiefly and mainly law must needs be
referred. Now the first principle in practical matters, which are the
object of the practical reason, is the last end: and the last end of
human life is bliss or happiness, as stated above .... Consequently
the law must needs regard principally the relationship to happiness.
Moreover, since every part is ordained to the whole, as imperfect to
perfect; and since one man is a part of the perfect community, the
law must needs regard properly the relationship to universal
happiness. Wherefore the Philosopher, in the above definition of
legal matters mentions both happiness and the body politic: for he
says (Ethic. v. 1) that we call those legal matters "just, which are
adapted to produce and preserve happiness and its parts for the body
politic".. 129
2. Aquinas's Teleological Philosophy of Nature
For Aquinas, nature itself is a source of moral norms.130 The natural law is
knowable through the inclinations of nature. 3' However, for modem readers,
the terminology of "nature" is very confusing and raises many questions.
Nature in the modem sense typically either means the object of scientific study,
explainable in terms of basic "laws" and elementary particles or a Romantic
state of primeval purity, unencumbered by human conventions and
unadulterated by technology. Thus, nature is either the world of extended,
quantified things (i.e., material bodies), as analyzed in terms of their common
physical and chemical properties or "laws," or it is the pristine wilderness of
Romantic ardor, or perhaps just organic fruits and nuts.
Aquinas' concept of nature is something quite different. Aquinas, following
Aristotle, accepts as an obvious fact our experience of the world as being full of
128. Id. at Q. 90, art. 2, reply 2.
129. Id.
130. See generally JAN AERTSEN, NATuRE AND CREATURE: THOMAS AQuINAs's WAY OF
THOUGHT (1988).
131. SeeQ. 94, art. 2.
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many different kinds (natures) of things that cannot be explained simply in
terms of their material or chemical constituents. Though chemistry teaches us
that all things are made of carbon, nitrogen, hydrogen, and other elements, and
that each atom is made up of certain elementary particles and a lot of "empty
space," we do not see or feel these things in our ordinary experience. Non-
living things-plants, animals, and human beings-are all of different kinds.
Moreover, we know and understand things according to their kinds--our
knowledge of how one set of oranges tastes gives us the ability to predict and
expect something about other oranges; our knowledge of how one set of
squirrels act under conditions of drought give us the ability to predict and
expect something about how other squirrels would act under similar conditions.
Not even the most disciplined scientist or skeptical philosopher experiences a
world devoid of these common-sense distinctions.
32
For Aquinas each kind of thing moves or behaves in a manner according to
its intrinsic nature. Natural things are not simply machines-whether made by
a "Divine watchmaker" or by blind forces of chance and necessity.133 The
132. Indeed all scientists and philosophers depend on them to begin their everyday work-
the writing of a treatise or the running of a scientific experiment depends crucially on the
reliability of everyday knowledge about pens, paper, computers and word processors, lab
benches, instruments and their dials, mathematical knowledge learned via color pens on a
whiteboard, etc.
133. Aquinas' concept of nature is not the same as Newton's mechanical vision of the
universe. For Aquinas, God creates natures with an intrinsic capacity of self-organization. For
Newton, and accordingly for William Blackstone and William Paley, nature is like a machine
operated by God. Blackstone's concept of natural law is somewhat similar to Aquinas', but
appears to rely on a mechanical philosophy of nature:
Law, in its most general and comprehensive sense, signifies a rule of action; and
is applied indiscriminately to all kinds of action, whether animate or inanimate,
rational or irrational. Thus we say, the laws of motion, of gravitation, of optics, or
mechanics, as well as the laws of nature and of nations. And it is that rule of
action, which is prescribed by some superior, and which the inferior is bound to
obey.
Thus when the Supreme Being formed the universe, and created matter out of
nothing, he impressed certain principles upon that matter, from which it can never
depart, and without which it would cease to be. When he put that matter into
motion, he established certain laws of motion, to which all movable bodies must
conform. And, to descend from the greatest operations to the smallest, when a
workman forms a clock, or other piece of mechanism, he establishes at his own
pleasure certain arbitrary laws for its direction,-as that the hand shall describe a
given space in a given time, to which law as long as the work conforms, so long it
continues in perfection, and answers the end of its formation.
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motions of natural things are not entirely reducible to the laws of physics and
chemistry. Rather, each natural kind has its own intrinsic purpose or telos.
This purpose is not the same as some sort of miniature spirit or vital force.
Rather, the purpose is a sort of intrinsic reason in the thing. Although these
purposes are created by God (whether directly or indirectly), they are
intrinsically intelligible by man.
The concept of natural purpose is not necessarily instrumental with respect to
human beings. The purpose of an acorn is not simply to provide a shady oak
tree; the acorn has its own intrinsic purposive tendency to develop into a tree.
Man can readily grasp the purposive motion and development of the growing
tree. Modem science describes the physico-chemical mechanisms that make
the unfolding of nature possible, but the self-organizing, self-perfecting
character of the tree's nature is readily grasped by reason and sense perception
prior to an elucidation of the physico-chemical basis for the tree's internal
principles of operation. According to Aquinas:
Nature is nothing but the plan of some art, namely a divine one,
put into things themselves, by which those things move towards a
concrete end: as if the man who builds up a ship could give to the
pieces of wood that they could move by themselves to produce the
form of the ship. 134
Being a healthy, fully grown tree is the acorn's intrinsic telos.
3. Human Teleology
Aquinas' notion of human purpose builds on his teleological philosophy of
nature. A man is not a rock, an acorn, or a dolphin, but he has much in
common with each of these things. Because a man is not a disembodied spirit,
the precepts of the natural law follow upon the inclinations of nature at several
For as God, when he created matter, and endued it with a principle of mobility,
established certain rules for the perpetual direction of that motion, so, when he
created man, and endued him with freewill to conduct himself in all parts of life,
he laid down certain immutable laws of human nature, whereby that free-will is in
some degree regulated and restrained, and gave him also the faculty of reason to
discover the purport of those laws.
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, *24, *26.
134. THOMAS AQUINAS, IN OcTo LIBROS PHYSICORUM ARISTOTELIS ExposITio 130
(Marietti Editori 1954), quoted in MARIANO ARTIGAS, THE MIND OF THE UNIVERSE:
UNDERSTANDING SCIENCE AND RELIGION 156 (2000).
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levels. "Wherefore according to the order of natural inclinations, is the order of
the precepts of the natural law." '35 The level of natural teleology in man is the
inclination of self-preservation, which Aquinas regards as characteristic of all
substances, including animals, plants and even non-living things.
Because in man there is first of all an inclination to good in accordance with
the nature which he has in common with all substances: in as much as every
substance seeks the preservation of its own being, according to is nature: and by
reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of preserving human life, and of
warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law.
36
Second is the inclination man has "in common with other animals.' 37 This
animal inclination includes those things "'which nature has taught to all
animals,' ... such as sexual intercourse, education of offspring and so forth."'
' 38
Third is the inclination specific to man as a rational creature.
[T]here is in man an inclination to good, according to the nature of
his reason, which nature is proper to him: thus man has a natural
inclination to . . . live in society: and in this respect, whatever
pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law; for instance, to
shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to
live, and other such things regarding the above inclination.
139
For Aquinas, the ultimate end and highest good of man is theological, not
merely natural. Following Augustine, he believed that the beatific vision of
God is the ultimate end of man. However, for Aquinas, grace builds upon
nature, and his ethics of human purpose is mostly compatible, and indeed
largely based upon, Aristotle's understanding of practical reasoning, virtue, and
the natural good of the human being, for whom the highest natural good is
friendship and living peaceably within the polis.140  For Aquinas, as for
Aristotle, anything that is contrary to man's nature is bad because it is contrary
to the fulfillment of his highest purpose.
4. Can There Be Natural Law without Nature?
Aquinas's common sense view of law is based in part on his common-sense
understanding of natural law, which, in turn, is based on his common-sense
135. AQUINAS, supra note 1, at Q 94, art. 2, c.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See generally RUSSELL HITrINGER, THE FIRST GRACE: REDISCOVERING THE NATURAL
LAW IN A POST-CHRISTIAN WORLD (2003).
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understanding of nature. Modem science and modem philosophy, however,
reject such common sense teleology as scientifically disproven, technologically
useless, laughably anthropomorphic, or even as a pantheistic holdover from
Greek paganism.14 1 Some scholars have suggested that because modem science
has discredited certain conclusions of Aristotelian science, natural teleology is a
fatal flaw in any attempt to refurbish Aquinas's natural law theory. According
to Leo Strauss, "[t]he teleological view of the universe, of which the
teleological view of man forms a part, would seem to have been destroyed by
modem natural science.' 4 2 Scott Buchanan states the problem trenchantly:
The reflective reason in man is clearly purposive, but the rest of
nature sleeps in its mechanical and mathematical order. Technical
man can impose purposes on natural objects by quasi-magical arts;
he can even invent purposes and bend nature to his will.... The
classical doctrine of human nature then exists in the modem world
as a mere humanism. This, I believe, is what paralyzes the doctrine
of natural law in the modem world, and prevents it from reviving its
full force by penetrating the equations and mechanisms that pervade
both natural and social science.
43
As a result, some modem natural law theorists simply jettison natural
teleology as obsolete, replaceable by less "biological" notions borrowed from
Kant or others. 44 In any event, it is difficult to avoid natural teleology in
reading or making sense of Aquinas's natural law theory. A full recovery of
Aquinas's natural law jurisprudence will require a recovery of his teleological
understanding of nature.
141. Id.
142. According to Yves Simon:
It goes without saying that there cannot be such a thing as natural law in a
thoroughly mechanistic universe. When mechanism is associated with idealism, as
it is in Descartes and most modem philosophers... we have values instead of
natural laws.... [V]alues have generally been conceived as placed in things,
imposed upon them, forced into them by the human mind. Assuming that we still
retain a sense for the distinction between the right and the wrong, what else can we
do if things have no nature and no finality of their own?
SIMON, supra note 34, at 50.
143. BucHANAN, supra note 13, at 303 ("This is the reason that so-called secondary natural
law seems arbitrary, dated, and dogmatic when it makes particular determinations.").
144. See FiNNIS, supra note 13, at 33-34 (arguing that a teleological conception of nature is
irrelevant to natural law reasoning).
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A thorough discussion of Aquinas' philosophy of nature is far beyond the
scope of this Article. It should not be assumed, however, that Aquinas's
teleological understanding of nature is dead. On the contrary, in the past
several decades, a widening stream of scholarship and scientific inquiry has
bolstered teleological philosophies of nature. Many eminent Thomist
philosophers have seriously engaged the problem of natural teleology in
relation to modem science. 45 Jewish and secular Aristotelians have made
parallel contributions. 46  At the same time, many scientists (both
experimentalists and theoreticians) and philosophers of science have
acknowledged the shortcomings of a mechanical understanding of nature, in
favor of theories of self-organization, or a restored and purified understanding
of "natural powers, 147 "capacities,"' 48 and even the long-discarded notion of
things having intrinsic "natures."
149
V. CONCLUSION: TWO TRADITIONS
There is no single "Western tradition" of law. There are, rather, two
opposite traditions. The first tradition is a jurisprudence of common sense
which embraces reason, legitimate authority, and a common moral order. This
primary tradition also embraces vigorous principles of limited government,
individual liberties and the rule of law, albeit as practical limitations for the
sake of the common good, not as ends in themselves. It speaks of truth and
goodness with confidence--of law and public good without guilt or fear that
there really is no such thing or that at bottom it is socially constructed or merely
the aggregation of selfish individual desires. It accepts the contingency and
messiness of human affairs without rejecting common sense or attempting to
base the science of human affairs on something more clear and distinct.
The second tradition is a skeptical tradition which rejects the reality or
relevance of objective truth, moral order, or a common good. It was born of
145. See, e.g., ARTIGAS, supra note 134; Richard F. Hassing, Modern Natural Science and
the Intelligibility of Human Experience, in FINAL CAUSALITY IN NATURE AND HUMAN AFFAIRS
211-56 (Richard F. Hassing ed., 1997); Richard F. Hassing, Introduction, in HASSING, supra;
WILLIAM A. WALLACE, THE MODELING OF NATURE: PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF
NATURE IN SYNTHESIS (1996); Michael Augros, Reconciling Science With Natural Philosophy,
68 THE THOMIST 105 (2004). See also www.isnature.org (website of the Institute for the Study
of Nature).
146. Adler, supra note 20; Kass, supra note 20.
147. ROM HARRE, LAWS OF NATURE (1993).
148. NANCY CARTWRIGHT, NATURE'S CAPACITIES AND THEIR MEASUREMENT (1989).
149. NANCY CARTWRIGHT, THE DAPPLED WORLD: A STUDY OF THE BOUNDARIES OF SCIENCE
(1999).
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moral skepticism rooted, in turn, in a rejection of natural purposes. In its youth,
it substituted a rational calculus of individual self-interest for natural law and
the common good. In middle age, it went in various directions, exalting logical
form over moral content, or rejecting forms in favor of sorting through hard-
nosed empirical data to predict what judges will do. In its dotage, it now turns
against itself, rejecting even reason in favor of the will to political power. This
tradition has coexisted with the first tradition by feeding off of the moral capital
of the prior tradition. Moral relativists may well pay their taxes, seek a just
society, and care for their children. Deconstructionists certainly hope that
people will buy, read, and understand their books. But the bitter fruits of a
half-true philosophy are now ripe: social pathology and the absence of a
common intellectual culture.
The root problem is what counts as knowledge. For Aquinas, as for
Aristotle, the knowledge of human things is not the same as mathematical or
experimental knowledge, but it is still true knowledge. Language
communicates truth about objective reality, albeit imperfectly. Ethical and
political knowledge is based on common opinion and experience, but applying
the natural law to specific circumstances is not always easy. Human reason is
capable of discerning purpose in nature, including human nature.
By contrast, for much of modem philosophy, words are arbitrary names,
unmoored from reality. Common experience is fundamentally deceptive and
must be replaced by something narrower. "Feigning the world to be
annihilated," Hobbes and Descartes reject common experience in favor of clear
and distinct ideas drawn from mathematics or experimental science. 50 There is
no highest good, only the lowest common denominator of self-interest in terms
of pleasure and survival. Natural law, and by extension human law, becomes
nothing but a mechanism for optimizing individual liberty to acquire comforts
and security. Jurisprudence becomes a formal order of concepts devoid of
moral content (positivism) or a quasi-scientific effort to predict the behavior of
judges (legal realism).
But if language is only a game, and the only real knowledge is knowledge of
quantity or "empirical" analysis, then notions of objective truth in human
matters and moral order are no better than belief in unicorns. If reason is
fundamentally unreliable, and moral order unknowable, the skeptics and cynics
win. In that case, the only thing preventing complete chaos is "natural"
Hobbesian self-interest as desire for comfort and fear of violent death.' 5 ' Law
150. See supra note 145.
151. Instead of naturally inclining toward the highest good, "man by nature chooseth the
lesser evill [sic]." HOBBES, supra note 84, at 199.
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becomes nothing but sophistry, or at best a vehicle for implementing a half-
philosophy of radical individualism or economic materialism.
The moral foundations and, increasingly, the rational foundations of law
have been under attack for centuries. To recover the primary tradition, it will
be necessary to squarely address the philosophical bases of the "Nothing But"
tradition by answering several questions. Can language reliably communicate
truth, and, if so, how reliable must it be? Can we acknowledge the limitations
of language without concluding that it is inherently arbitrary? Can there be a
true "science" of politics based on an unabashed acceptance of a common
good? Is there a common good which is proportionate to the good of the
individual human person? What is the good of the human person by nature?
Finally, without natural purposes, is the natural law tradition a house built upon
sand?
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